Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
10-2014

Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The Story Behind the
Spread of Class Action-Barring Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card
Agreements
Nancy A. Welsh
Texas A&M University School of Law, nwelsh@law.tamu.edu

Stephen J. Ware

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Nancy A. Welsh & Stephen J. Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The Story Behind the Spread of
Class Action-Barring Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, 21 Disp. Resol. Mag. 18 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/996

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Ross et al. v. American Express et al.
The Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring
Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements

A

Nancy A. Welsh and Stephen J. Ware

recent case from the Southern District of New York,
Ross et al v. American Express et al, is an antitrust
case, but it also is an important case for arbitration.
Ross consolidated several class actions in which plaintiffs
alleged that major credit card issuing banks, including
American Express (Amex), First USA, Bank of America,
Citibank, Chase, Discover, and others “violated the
Sherman Act by agreeing with their competitors to implement and maintain mandatory class action-barring arbitration clauses as a term or condition for holding their general
purpose credit cards.”1
Several defendants settled, but Judge William H. Pauley
III conducted a bench trial for the remainder. He ruled in
favor of the remaining defendants, finding that a conspiracy
in violation of the Sherman Act “requires proof of joint or
concerted action as opposed to unilateral action”2 and that
plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of proof. In May 2014,
the plaintiffs filed an appeal in the Second Circuit.
Judge Pauley’s 90-plus page opinion details four years of
activity among the credit card issuers, including their participation in 28 organizational meetings, email exchanges,
telephone calls, in-person conversations, and other events
in which representatives discussed the benefits of class
action-barring arbitration clauses, public relations, pending
litigation, and clauses likely to survive judicial review.
Before this series of meetings and communications, two
of the defendant banks had adopted class action-barring
arbitration clauses. By the time the meetings ended, all
the defendant banks had adopted such clauses, with
approximately 87% of all general-purpose credit card
transactions subject to both arbitration and a prohibition
against class action.3
According to Judge Pauley’s opinion, First USA, which
implemented a credit card arbitration clause in 1998
(becoming the first defendant bank to do so), hired “an outspoken advocate against class action lawsuits” as its “arbitration consultant” and assigned him to “create some sort of
forum to talk about arbitration issues.”4 About 18 months
later, Amex adopted its own credit card arbitration clause,
reasoning that it “would benefit Amex by lowering litigation
costs in the short term and [avoiding] very expensive class
action suits in the medium to longer term.”5
During this time period, partners at two law firms began
working with First USA and Amex to hold meetings
with other banks’ senior in-house credit card counsel.
The partners’ goal was to “show [their] stuff” on “issues
of common concern,” including arbitration and later,
to “round up other businesses that might want to join a
coalition to defend and foster arbitration.” 6 Meetings of
the “Arbitration Coalition” grew to include a “phalanx”7 of
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lawyers from top firms as well as representatives from various banks, consumer lenders, trade associations, and public
relations firms.8
The attendees apparently agreed to share arbitrationrelated thoughts and materials, including FAQ responses,
customer identification materials, legal briefs, arbitration
clauses, and change-in-terms notices.9 The organizers also
sought contributions from the participants to fund amicus
briefs filed in arbitration matters pending before the US
Supreme Court.10 The Arbitration Coalition spawned two
other groups – the “Consumer Companies Class Action
Working Group” and the “In-House Working Group,”
which consisted entirely of in-house counsel and met several times by teleconference. On an ad hoc basis, in-house
counsel also questioned each other about arbitration clause
adoptions. Occasionally, dispute resolution organizations
were involved.
From these and other facts, Judge Pauley concluded that
the banks had reached “an agreement to explore collective
advocacy efforts aimed at expanding the enforceability of
arbitration clauses and to establish class action-barring
arbitration as an industry norm.”11 Indeed, he observed that
“[d]irect evidence of this agreement abounds in meeting
agendas, solicitations to fund amicus briefs and research,
and willingness to explore joint action such as the FAQs
project or self-regulation efforts.”12 Arbitration clauses were
“not salient” (i.e., “visible or meaningful”) to consumers
during the relevant period,13 and Judge Pauley concluded
the banks had “a motive to conspire in the adoption of
arbitration clauses”14 because “collusion would ensure that
no Issuing Bank facilitated a rise to salience before arbitration was firmly entrenched as the industry norm. Collusion
would also help to ensure that each bank’s clause was [of]
sufficient quality [to] withstand legal challenges that could
undermine the enforceability of every bank’s clause.”15
Judge Pauley examined the concept of salience, observing that late fees, over-the-limit fees, and foreign currency
exchange fees in the credit card and banking industries
became salient only when issuers began offering credit
cards that did not include such fees. Thus, competitors
forced “obscure terms to salience in order to distinguish and
market their products.” Judge Pauley also highlighted consumers’ ability to learn about such terms through personal
experience, the experience of other consumers, and advice
from consumer groups and advocates that “facilitate[s] a
term’s rise to salience…..”16
Despite these observations, however, Judge Pauley concluded that no conspiracy or other antitrust violation was
necessary to induce each bank to adopt arbitration clauses
because “avoiding class actions through arbitration was in

each Issuing Bank’s independent self[-]interest, regardless
of whether its competitors also adopted such a provision.
... Unlike some other cost-saving measures, the benefit
of arbitration – avoiding class action litigation – was not
diminished if competitors were in on the secret.”17 He added
that “[w]hile the tenor of the meetings was heavily slanted
in favor of arbitration, the record indicates that the final
decision to adopt class-action-barring arbitration clauses
was something the Issuing Banks hashed out individually
and internally. … While there is evidence the Issuing Banks
tried to determine their competitors’ plans and experiences
regarding arbitration, as would be expected in an oligopoly,
this Court does not discern any concerted action arising
from those inquiries.”18
Judge Pauley described the evidence as “ambiguous” –
permitting an inference of illegality but also with “inferences of legitimate activity” that were “just as persuasive.”19 “While the collusive adoption and maintenance
of arbitration clauses would have entrenched arbitration
as an industry standard, this Court is convinced that the
evidence is just as consistent with legitimate activity in
furtherance of the Issuing Banks’ independent self[-]
interests.”20 The banks did not need to conspire to “be
motivated to cooperate on efforts to sway public opinion
and defend the legality of their clauses in the courts and
legislatures. Perceiving that class action attorneys would
lobby and litigate to undermine the enforceability of
arbitration clauses, the Issuing Banks networked to thwart
the plaintiffs’ bar. When the motive to cooperate is just
as consistent with legitimate goals as non-legitimate goals,
there can be no fair inference of collusion.”21
Ultimately, Judge Pauley issued cautionary words about
the role of outside counsel and the credit card issuers’ costbenefit analysis:

When outside counsel convene meetings of competitors in the hope of propelling themselves to
the forefront of an emerging trend – in this case,
class-action-barring consumer arbitration agreements – they do so at their professional peril. … It
was only by a slender reed that Plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the lawyers who organized these
meetings had spawned a Sherman Act conspiracy
among their clients.
In retrospect, the Issuing Banks’ short-term
goal of lowering litigation costs eluded them.
Undoubtedly, retaining some of the most esteemed
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antitrust lawyers in the nation to counter the
extraordinary talents of Plaintiffs’ counsel imposed
a significant burden on the Issuing Banks. Only
the passage of time will reveal whether the Issuing
Banks’ longer-term goal of avoiding the expense of
class action lawsuits can be achieved.22
Although Ross is an antitrust case, both of us believe it
may inform policy debates about consumer arbitration. We
disagree, however, on some of the ruling’s other implications. One of us, Ware, believes Ross shows that at least
some very knowledgeable and sophisticated lawyers and
businesspeople think enforcement of consumers’ arbitration
agreements saves so much money that it is worth their while
to go to great lengths to get it. For Ware, an important
policy question is whether enough of these cost-savings are
passed on to consumers to more than offset any negatives
consumers experience from such enforcement. For Welsh,
Ross challenges consumer advocates, agencies, and businesses to educate consumers about – and make salient – the
value of “regular people’s” continued access to our public
courts; Ross also challenges the dispute resolution field (and
individual service providers) to involve both consumer and
business interests as we seek the appropriate institutionalization of consumer arbitration and other processes. u
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